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E-voting has been embraced by a number of countries, deliver-
ing benefits in terms of efficiency and accessibility. End-to-end
verifiable e-voting schemes facilitate verification of the integri-
ty of individual votes during the election process. In particular,
methods for cast-as-intended verification enable voters to con-
firm that their cast votes have not been manipulated by the
voting client. A well-known technique for effecting cast-as-
intended verification is the Benaloh Challenge. The usability
of this challenge is crucial because voters have to be actively
engaged in the verification process. In this paper, we report on
a usability evaluation of three different approaches of the Be-
naloh Challenge in the remote e-voting context. We performed
a comparative user study with 95 participants. We conclude
with a recommendation for which approaches should be provi-
ded to afford verification in real-world elections and suggest
usability improvements.
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INTRODUCTION
Elections are the cornerstone of modern democracies. With the
explosion of digitization, governments have embraced electro-
nic solutions in many areas, and elections are no exception.
Prime examples are Switzerland [43] and Estonia [19], which
allow voters to cast votes via remote e-voting channels during
national elections.
There are clear advantages to employing remote e-voting as
a vote-casting channel. For example, it is trivial for voters
living abroad to cast votes, and tallying is more efficient and
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accurate. Yet it has to be acknowledged that the deployment
of technology introduces risks of deliberate vote manipulation.
There may be those who wish to illegally influence the out-
come of elections using a range of possible attacks [28, 44].
To increase the possibility that such vote manipulations are
detected, a number of assurance measures are required, similar
to election-monitoring processes for paper-based voting.
Such assurance can be provided if e-voting schemes imple-
ment end-to-end verifiability [3, 23]. End-to-end verifiable
e-voting schemes enable monitoring of each vote processing
step. As such, these schemes enable verification that: (1) the
voting client encoded the vote matching the voter’s intent (cast-
as-intended verifiability), (2) the vote recorded by the voting
system matches the cast vote (recorded-as-cast verifiability),
and (3) the recorded vote is correctly included in the election
result (tallied-as-recorded verifiability).
The first of these, cast-as-intended verifiability, presents a
particular challenge from the human-computer interaction per-
spective, since there is currently no way to exclude the voter
from the verification process. If the verification process is un-
usable voters will not be able to verify their vote, and might
abort verification because it takes too long. This potentially
jeopardizes the integrity of the election.
In this paper, we focus on the usability of a widely-adopted
technique for supporting cast-as-intended verifiability: the so-
called Benaloh Challenge [10, 11], which is implemented by
several voting schemes, e.g. [4, 8, 9]. When this challenge has
been implemented, voting proceeds as follows. Voters com-
mence voting by making their choice, which the voting client
then encrypts. The Benaloh Challenge subsequently gives vo-
ters two options: (1) to vote, or (2) to verify. In the first case
they cast the encrypted vote. In the second they verify that
the encrypted vote accurately reflects their expressed choice.
Because verification, as implemented by the Benaloh Challen-
ge, is not compatible with vote secrecy, verified votes must
be discarded. Verification is performed with the assistance of
a so-called verifier: software running either on the voting or
supplementary device, such as a Smartphone.
Three possibilities for performing the Benaloh Challenge in
the context of remote e-voting have been proposed in the
literature [4,32,38]. The first of these is a manual approach [4]
which has already been used in legally binding elections, e.g.
Figure 1: Sequence diagram of one verification with the Benaloh Challenge.
[5, 27, 30]. The second automatic approach [32] is a research
proposal that offers the same level of security as the manual
approach while automating some of the manual steps required
by the first approach. Both of these approaches reveal nefarious
activities of a malicious voting client, i.e. the software that
is responsible for encrypting the vote. Unfortunately, they do
not mitigate against other corrupted software on the voter’s
personal computer. A possibility is that the browser used to
access the voting website has been compromised. To offer
protection against such an eventuality, the third approach, the
mobile approach [38], proposes the use of a supplementary
device to carry out verification.
In order to determine which approach is most usable, we per-
formed a comparative evaluation in a between-subjects study
with 95 participants, which we analyzed quantitatively as well
as qualitatively. The quantitative evaluation showed that the
automatic and mobile approaches are significantly more ef-
ficient than the manual approach. Our qualitative evaluation
also revealed that the participants using the mobile approach
encountered problems that can be mitigated by improving the
implementation. The other approaches, however, suffer from
problems that cannot be mitigated by implementation or inter-
face improvements, because they are approach-specific. We
thus recommend that the mobile approach is made available
during elections. Because the mobile approach requires access
to a supplementary device, we recommend also offering the
automatic approach as an alternative, to enhance inclusiveness.
We conclude this paper by providing recommendations for
usability improvements.
BACKGROUND: THE BENALOH CHALLENGE
A well-known technique for confirming that votes have be-
en “cast-as-intended” is the Benaloh Challenge [10, 11]. In
a voting scheme that utilizes the Benaloh Challenge, voters
have two options after choosing a voting option and having
the voting client encrypt their choices. They can either (1) vote
by casting the encrypted vote, or (2) verify that the encrypted
vote does indeed reflect their expressed choice.
The power of the Benaloh Challenge is that a manipulator can
not predict whether the voter will vote or verify, nor how often
he or she will choose to verify. Hence, even if a manipula-
tor has been able to corrupt a voter’s device, he or she does
not know when it is safe to manipulate the voter’s choice. If
the manipulator changes the vote and the voter verifies, he
or she will detect the manipulation. If the manipulator does
not change the vote, and the voter chooses to cast the vote,
the opportunity for manipulation is lost. It is this unpredicta-
bility that gives the Benaloh Challenge its power. Voters are
advised to repeat the challenge until they are satisfied and
convinced that the voting client is behaving correctly. They
are told that such repetition solidifies assurance, as explained
above. The voter, Alice, proceeds as follows (the steps refer to
the sequence diagram of the protocol depicted in Figure 1):
1) Alice commences by selecting a voting option, and indica-
ting her choice via the voting client.
2) The voting client then encrypts the choice. During encryp-
tion, the voting client generates a random value on the fly,
ensuring that encryption is individualized.
3) To ease verification, a hash, further denoted as a check-code,
is derived from the encrypted vote and displayed to the voter.
(This code is shorter than the fully encrypted vote, and thus
easier for the voter to manage.)
4) Alice takes note of the displayed check-code1. She can then
choose between one of two actions:
(a) to vote: to complete the process by casting the encrypted
vote, she proceeds to Step 6.
(b) to verify: to check that the encrypted vote does indeed
reflect her choice, she proceeds to Step 5.
1Even if Alice does not verify, she can use the noted check-code later
on to ensure that her cast vote has been recorded and tallied correctly.
5) Verify. The Benaloh Challenge executes as follows:
(a) The voting client provides the verification data, consi-
sting of Alice’s marked choice and the random value.
(b) Alice chooses a verifier.
(c) Alice transfers the verification data to the verifier.
(d) The verifier independently calculates an encrypted vote
and check-code by using the provided verification data.
(e) The verifier displays a check-code, together with the
choice that was encrypted.
(f) Alice compares the original and verifier-displayed
check-codes and her intended choice to the verifier-
displayed one. If they match, she knows that all is
well: she has verified that her choice was encrypted
correctly.
The verified vote cannot be cast, because the verification
data could later on be used to break vote secrecy. Alice must
now discard the verified vote and return to Step 1 to cast her
actual vote.
6) Vote. Alice casts the encrypted vote, and finalizes the voting
process.
Steps 1 to 5 can be traversed as many times as desired, until
Alice is satisfied. Step 6 can only be carried out once.
RELATED WORK
Paper-based voting, as well as e-voting schemes, have be-
en subjected to usability evaluations. Such evaluations in-
clude investigations into the usability of paper ballots, pa-
per punch cards and lever machines [14, 20, 26]. Further stu-
dies [7,13,16,21,29,48] have focused on the usability of Direct
Recording Electronics (DREs), the computers used for voting
in polling stations. Smartphone-based systems have also been
investigated [15]. The accessibility and usability of E-voting
schemes have been evaluated [24, 34, 35]. The usability of
polling station schemes has also been investigated [37,50]. All
of these studies acknowledge usability as a crucial feature of
voting systems, as the voters might make errors that influence
the integrity of the election result.
Other research has focused on end-to-end verifiable e-voting
schemes which assist voters in “tracing” their vote throughout
the election process. Realpe-Muñoz et al. performed a user
study of the Helios voting scheme and the University of Llei-
da (UdL) [41] remote e-voting system using an eye-tracking
device. Their participants did not realize that they needed to
verify their votes. Weber and Hengartner [49] performed a
usability study of the Helios implementation of the Benaloh
Challenge with 20 participants. Only two of the participants
were able to verify successfully, being overwhelmed by the
displayed verification data. Acemyan et al. [1] investigated the
usability of three end-to-end-verifiable voting systems: Helios
(incl. the Benaloh Challenge), Prêt á Voter and Scantegrity II
in a lab study with 37 participants. Only 43% of participants
using the Benaloh Challenge were able to verify their vote
successfully. The verification process of the Benaloh Challen-
ge also received a very poor SUS score [12] of 20 out of 100.
Neumann et al. [38] addressed participants’ concerns that a
verifier in the Benaloh Challenge might be able to break vote
secrecy [31]. Neumann et al. aimed to maintain secrecy by hi-
ding the verified choice. Only the random value is transferred.
The verifier uses the random value to encrypt all voting opti-
ons and compute all possible check-codes. Then it displays all
possible pairs of voting options and check-codes. Voters are
instructed to open the browser’s search bar and to search for
their check-codes. This approach, however, does not achieve
its aims. The verifier’s website could use JavaScript to track
which check-codes voters search for and thereby detect their
choices. It also introduces additional steps into the verification
process, potentially impacting usability.
EVALUATED APPROACHES
We present three possible approaches for conducting the Be-
naloh Challenge from the literature, which we evaluated and
compared in our study.
Manual Approach
The first evaluated approach is the Helios-implemented Be-
naloh Challenge [4] further denoted as the manual approach.
In this case the check-code is a 43-digit cryptographic hash
over the encrypted vote. The voter, Alice, has to write it down
and choose to verify. The verification data, consisting of her
marked choice and the individual random value, are displayed
(Step 5(a) in Figure 1). To transfer the verification data to the
verifier, Alice selects the data and copies it to her clipboard.
The verifier, in this case, is a trusted verification institute that
Alice chooses from a list (Step 5(b)). Any research group,
company or individual can be a verification institute. The veri-
fier’s website is automatically launched in another browser tab
and Alice pastes the copied verification data into a text box
(Step 5(c)). After the verifier has recalculated the encrypted
vote and check-code (Step 5(d)), it displays the check-code
and the encrypted choice to Alice (Step 5(e)). She can then
compare those to the check-code issued by the voting client
and her choice (Step 5(f), see also Figure 2).
Figure 2: Result of the verification in the manual approach.
Figure 3: Result of the verification in the automatic approach.
Automatic Approach
This approach eliminates the copying step required by the
manual approach. Karayumak et al. [32] performed a cognitive
walkthrough of the manual approach and proposed the removal
of the copy-paste step from the verification process. Instead
of having the voter copy-and-paste the verification data, this
data is automatically transmitted to the verifier in Step 5(c)
via HTTPS. Thus, after choosing a verifier, the voter, Alice,
immediately sees the re-calculated check-code and choice, but
still has to manually check that the two are the same. The
proposal was implemented and evaluated by Karayumak et
al. [31] in a user study with 34 participants, but not compared
to the manual approach.
For our study, the automatic approach is executed as follows.
First Alice records the check-code and opts to verify. Then
she chooses a verifier (verification institute) from a list. The
verification data is then automatically transmitted to the veri-
fier and the result is displayed (see Figure 3). The subsequent
steps do not differ from the manual approach.
Mobile Approach
The third investigated approach is proposed by Neumann et al.
[38]. Their approach targets the assumption that the integrity of
the election result relies on the use of supplementary devices.
Therefore, Neumann et al. propose the use of a supplementary
device as verifier to carry out verification.
Thus, instead of writing down the check-code in Step 4, Alice
scans a QR-code representing the check-code, using a sup-
plementary device such as a Smartphone, further denoted as
mobile device. In doing so Alice also transfers the check-code
to the mobile device. Alice opts for verification and is redi-
rected to a second QR-code containing the verification data.
The mobile device scans the second QR-code (Step 5(c)) and
uses the data to recalculate the check-code (Step 5(d)). The
recalculated check-code is then automatically compared to the
previously scanned one. Thus, the comparison of the check-
code that Alice performs in Step 5(f) is no longer required.
Alice still needs to check that the mobile device used her cor-
rect choice for the verification, that is, that the choice displayed
on the mobile device matches her intended one (Step 5(f), see
also Figure 4). Neumann et al. claim that automating the ve-
rification steps removes some of the burden from the voter,
thereby improving usability. However, they did not formally
evaluate their proposal.
Figure 4: Result of the verification in the mobile approach.
Comparison of Approaches
The automatic and manual approaches differ only with respect
to the transfer of the random value and the marked choice.
The manual approach requires deliberate copying and pasting,
whereas in the automatic approach it is transmitted automati-
cally. In both approaches Alice has to manually compare her
recorded check-code with the one computed by the verifier.
Because the same device is used for voting and for verification,
the assumption of a trusted device must also hold in the auto-
matic approach. Thus, the automatic and manual approaches
offer the same level of security2. In the mobile approach all
data is transferred by scanning QR-codes. Thus, Alice does
not have to record the check-code manually. The mobile de-
vice verifier compares the check-codes and informs Alice of
mismatches. The deployment of a supplementary device to
effect verification weakens the assumption of a trusted voting
device with respect to vote integrity and makes the mobile
approach more secure than the manual and automatic approa-
ches. Even if the initial voting device (i.e. not just the voting
client) has been compromised, manipulations will be revealed
if the supplementary device is trustworthy. For further screens-
hots of the approaches the reader is referred to the paper’s
supplementary material.
METHOD
The motivation for our user study was to identify the most
usable of three Benaloh Challenge approaches. According to
the ISO 9241-11 [45], usability is based on the criteria of
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. Based on this ISO
standard we formulate our underlying research questions:
• Which of the approaches enables the most voters successful-
ly to verify their vote? [Effectiveness]
• Which of the approaches enables voters to verify their vote
more quickly? [Efficiency]
• Which of the approaches leads to the highest levels of user
satisfaction? [Satisfaction]
We do not assess the usability of the vote casting process;
only that of the different vote verification approaches. Hence,
we assess the effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction of the
2The manual approach does not exclude the usage of a supplementary
device for verification. The transfer of the verification data to such a
device, however, is not supported.
Figure 5: Study procedure including the paths for the three different groups.
tasks necessary for performing vote verification. We rely on
a number of metrics to achieve this. For effectiveness, we
consider the share of participants that were able to successfully
verify their votes (completion rate). For efficiency, we measure
the time that participants required to successfully complete the
verification (speed). For satisfaction, we collect SUS scores
by asking the questions from the System Usability Scale [12].
The automatic approach does not require the voter to interact
with the verification data. Hence, it is anticipated that voters
will make fewer mistakes, resulting in higher completion ra-
tes. Fewer interactions involving the voter ought also to be
less time consuming. We therefore formulate the following
hypotheses:
H1.1: The automatic approach is more effective than the ma-
nual approach.
H1.2: The automatic approach is more efficient than the manu-
al approach.
H1.3: The automatic approach leads to more satisfaction than
the manual approach.
In the mobile approach the voter does not have to record and
compare the check-code manually, so a more effective and
more efficient execution is anticipated. The corresponding
hypotheses are:
H2.1: The mobile approach is more effective than the manual
approach.
H2.2: The mobile approach is more efficient than the manual
approach.
H2.3: The mobile approach leads to more satisfaction than the
manual approach.
There is no research comparing the automatic and mobile
approaches. Based on the descriptions in the literature, we
formulate the following hypotheses:
H3.1: There are significant differences between the automatic
and mobile approaches in terms of effectiveness.
H3.2: There are significant differences between the automatic
and mobile approaches in terms of efficiency.
H3.3: There are significant differences between the automatic
and mobile approaches in terms of satisfaction.
Study Scenario
We chose the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) election,
which took place on September 24th 2017, as the scenario for
our user study. Due to the significance of this election, we an-
ticipated that participants would appreciate the importance of
verifying their votes and therefore perform the tasks diligently.
Furthermore, this election was current and open to all citizens.
We chose to include the BSI, Federal Office for Information
Security in Germany, and the OSCE, the Organization for Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe as verification institutes
suggested by [38] as being the ones participants were most
likely to trust. We included only two of the trusted institutions
so as not to overwhelm participants with too many options.
Study Design and Procedure
We conducted a between-subjects study, meaning that each
participant interacted with only one approach, in order to
prevent training effects. This resulted in three groups, one
group per evaluated approach. We opted for a lab study to
ensure we were able to control the environment and so that
we could record the screen during interactions with the voting
system. The participants were observed by the researcher, who
positioned herself so that she could see the participant’s actions
but not the computer screen. The study follows the guidelines
provided by the ethics commission at the author’s institution.
To test the study design we performed two pre-tests: the first
with two participants and the second with one participant.
The instructions and intent cards, which are detailed below,
were subsequently refined and improved. Our study required
participants to step through the following (see also Figure 5
for an overview):
(1) Welcome and Demographics: To commence, participants
were requested to provide their age, so that we could ensure
that they were over 18, or that they had a declaration of consent
from a legal guardian to participate. Having ensured that, we
then proceeded to inform participants of the purpose and the
process of the study, and the fact that screen-recording would
take place. The participant was requested to sign a declara-
tion of consent. Subsequently, they were asked for to record
age, gender, occupation and previous voting experiences in a
questionnaire.
(2) Intent Card: In order to determine whether the participant
could perform a successful verification in an objective way,
we chose to use screen-recordings. However, if the partici-
pants cast votes according to their own political preferences,
screen-recordings would violate the vote privacy. Hence, we
issued participants with an intent card telling them which party
to vote for. Because the study aimed to evaluate the usability
of verification, and not the true intentions of the participants,
the instructions explicitly instructed participants to carry out
the verification procedure. The intent card did not specify the
steps required for a successful verification, but instructed par-
ticipants to verify using either the website or mobile device.
Participants also received a faux letter from the election autho-
rity containing login credentials and some space for them to
use to write down the check-code. The mobile approach group
received a slightly different version mentioning the verifica-
tion device. If the participant was randomly allocated to the
mobile approach group, a Smartphone was provided with the
app pre-installed.
(3) Voting & Verification: The participants interacted with
the approach corresponding to their group, performing the
verification procedure and casting a vote as dictated by their
intent card. Time measurements were captured by the voting
client to assess efficiency. Participants informed the examiner
when they had completed all their assigned tasks.
(4) Questionnaire: After the participants reported completion,
they were handed a questionnaire containing the SUS questi-
ons [12]. We also wanted to gain insight into the participants’
impressions of the evaluated approaches. Therefore, we in-
cluded some open-ended questions. For example, we asked
whether they experienced any problems while performing veri-
fication, whether they thought they would perform verification
during an actual election and if so, how often they would carry
out verification. Each question contained some space for the
participants to justify their answers.
(5) End: After completing the questionnaire, participants we-
re given the opportunity to ask questions and were informed
that our research was not connected with officials of the Ger-
man parliament. Finally, the examiner thanked and reimbursed
them.
During Steps 3-5 the examiner recorded all participant com-
ments as well as the questions they asked during Step 5. All
documents and materials used in our study, as well as the sour-
ce code of the software and screenshots, are provided in this
paper’s supplementary material.
Prototypes and Setup
The manual approach is implemented in Helios and has an
open-source implementation. Although the source code is
publicly available3, the development commenced from scratch.
The main reason for this was that we wanted to match the
interface design to the election scenario from the study, namely,
to the German Federal Parliament election. Furthermore, the
system used in our study required additional functionality to
support data collection, such as timing all interactions. At the
same time, the cryptographic functionality of Helios was not
essential to the study’s aims, and, as such, could be simulated
in order to ensure the system had a realistic look and feel.
Hence, developing a new system was preferable to adjusting
the existing Helios implementation.
A voting website was implemented for each of the three tested
approaches and populated with texts and instructions mat-
ching the study scenario. All three interfaces were identical
except for the verification process. We made the following
adjustments to the check-codes in the manual and automatic
3https://github.com/benadida/helios-server, access 03-10-17
approaches. We adopted Karayumak et al.’s suggestion that
the check-code should not contain characters which are hard
to distinguish. We did not follow further suggestions by Ka-
rayumak et al. regarding the representation of check-codes,
namely, the suggestion to shorten the check-code to 16 cha-
racters. The length of the check-code is a security-critical
parameter, and a shorter check-code is unlikely to provide the
security required by a real-life election scenario. Hence, we
decided to rely on the original Helios check-codes that were
43 characters long. In order to make recording and compari-
son of the check-code easier, we split the check-code into four
character chunks, as shown in [18]. Moreover, in the manual
and automatic approaches we added some information about
the verification institutes to support the voters in choosing
an institute. Finally, in the mobile approach we added func-
tionality to detect incorrect QR-codes, providing instructions
on how to proceed. The back-end of the voting websites was
implemented in Python (Django v1.11). The front-end was
written in JavaScript (Angular). Voter actions were logged in
the database as time-stamped actions. The verification applica-
tion was implemented for Android, no controls were part of
the application and no hardware buttons were used. Because
verification would always be positive in the experiment, we
did not implement the management of a negative verification
outcome4. The voting website and the verification institutes’
websites were locally available via HTTPS. To be able to use
HTTPS locally, and to have the browser display it as trusted
website, we used a self-issued certificate. The verification ap-
plication was installed on a lab Android device provided to
participants.
Participants
We recruited 100 participants by contacting secondary schools,
advertising on social networks, mailing-lists, flyers, posters
and by word-of-mouth. Table 1 provides an overview of our
sample. The advertisement included a short description of the
study explaining that it was a usability study related to the
German Bundestag election.
Approach ∅ Age Gender [%] Occupation [%]
Manual
(N = 31)
Male: 38.7 School: 61.3
18.5 Female: 61.3 Univ.: 29.0
N/A: 0.0 Other: 9.7
Automatic
(N = 32)
Male: 62.5 School: 59.4
18.6 Female: 37.5 Univ.: 31.2
N/A: 0.0 Other: 9.4
Mobile
(N = 32)
Male: 37.5 School: 53.1
18.4 Female: 62.5 Univ.: 34.4
N/A: 0.0 Other: 12.5
Overall
(N = 95)
Male: 46.3 School: 57.9
18.5 Female: 53.7 Univ.: 31.6
N/A: 0.0 Other: 10.5
Table 1: Overview of our sample.
4The participants were instructed to notify the examiner if the verifi-
cation step revealed a problem.
Figure 6: Left: completion rates of the three approaches; Right: box plot of the time needed for a successful verification.
The participants either took part in the study at school or
university or received a financial reimbursement of e 10. We
restricted the participation to first-time voters (i.e. ages 17-
22) for the election of the German Bundestag in 2017 for
the following reasons. A survey in 2017 reported that voters
between 18 and 29 are the most likely to use remote e-voting in
a real election [25]. Hence, if remote e-voting were introduced
as an alternative channel to paper voting, young voters would
be one of its target users. Our participant choice also allowed
us to investigate the usability of the verification approaches
without encountering the effects of pre-existing mental models
related to Bundestag election experiences.
From the 100 participants, we had to exclude five from further
processing, as they either aborted or experienced technical
difficulties that prevented us from collecting the necessary data.
Of the remaining 95 participants, 46.3% (N = 44) were male
and 53.7% (N = 51) were female, with a median age of 18.5
years. Overall, 2.1% (N = 2) had previous e-voting experience
and 12.1% (N = 12) were technically-related students. The
rest were either school pupils, apprentices, university students
of non-technical specialties or unemployed.
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
We now report the quantitative results of our study, considering
the hypotheses outlined above.
Effectiveness
Overall, the majority of our participants could verify their
vote successfully. 61.3% (N = 19) were able to perform a suc-
cessful verification in the manual approach. The automatic
approach has a completion rate of 81.25% (N = 26). The mo-
bile approach received the same completion rate of 81.25%
(N = 26). Figure 6 (left side) depicts the completion rates of
the three approaches. Chi-Square tests do not reveal significant
differences between the three tested approaches (p> .05). The-
refore, the hypotheses H1.1 (the automatic approach is more
effective than the manual approach) and H2.1 (the mobile ap-
proach is more effective than the manual approach) cannot be
supported. Furthermore, H3.1 (there are significant differences
between the automatic and mobile approaches regarding ef-
fectiveness) can also not be supported, since they received
the same results. From the screen-recordings we observed the
progress of participants that commenced verification but abor-
ted, which allowed us to identify points of failure that need to
be addressed. 12.5% (N = 4) in the automatic approach only
opened the list of institutes and then aborted. In the mobile
approach 9.4% (N = 3) scanned the QR-code containing the
check-code but did not proceed further. 6.25% (N = 2) aborted
verification because, according to the feedback provided in
the questionnaire, the scan took too long. One participant per
group (3.1%) did not attempt verification at all.
Efficiency
We recorded the time taken for a successful verification as an
interval that starts when the participant presses the verification
button and ends when the participant returns to the voting
client. On average, the manual approach took roughly three
times as long as verification using the automatic approach (see
Table 2, also Figure 6 on the right). The manual approach
shows a high standard deviation, which is rooted in the results
of two participants. Participants using the mobile approach
were, on average, twice as fast as participants using the manual
approach. Efficiency was analyzed by a Welch ANOVA, in-
cluding only participants who successfully verified their vote.
The Welch ANOVA shows significant differences between the
three test groups (F(2,68) = 17.668, p < .001). In order to lo-
cate the differences we ran post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni
error correction. The post-hoc tests show that the manual ap-
proach is estimated to be on average 83.9 seconds slower than
the automatic approach (p < .001, η2 = .364). This supports
H1.2 meaning the automatic approach is more efficient than the
manual approach. Furthermore, the post-hoc tests show that
the manual approach is estimated to be, on average, 70.2 se-
conds slower than the mobile approach (p < .001, η2 = .260).
This supports H2.2 showing that the mobile approach is also
more efficient than the manual approach. The post-hoc tests
for the automatic, versus the mobile approach, do not reveal si-
gnificant differences between these proposals (p > .05). Thus,
the hypothesis H3.2 (there are significant differences between
the automatic and mobile approaches regarding efficiency)
cannot be supported.
Approach N Time [s] SD
Manual 19 131.3 83.3
Automatic 26 47.3 20.1
Mobile 26 61.1 33.8
Overall 71 74.8 59.6
Table 2: Durations for a successful verification.
Satisfaction
The automatic approach received the highest mean SUS score
with 79.4 (N = 26, SD = 15.5) out of 100 points. The manual
approach (Mean = 75.4, N = 19, SD = 15.6) and the mobile
approach (Mean= 75.8, N = 26, SD= 12.4) received relative-
ly similar mean SUS scores. A one-way ANOVA did not show
significant differences between the three approaches (p > .05).
Thus, the hypotheses H1.3, H2.3 and H3.3 cannot be supported.
The mean SUS score of the three approaches of 76.5 points to
a “C” on the grade scale (with as “A” best and as “F” worst
result) [6].
QUALITATIVE RESULTS
In this section we report the results of the questionnaire ana-
lysis, namely, the open-ended questions that we asked after
the SUS-related questions. Our goal thereby was to gain a
deeper insight into the usability problems that the participants
experienced during verification.
The questions that we evaluated were: “Did you experience
any problems during vote verification? If yes, which ones?”
and “Do you have any additional comments or feedback?”.
We analyzed the answers to these questions using an open-
coding approach [22]. There were three coding phases: (1)
developing the dictionary, (2) coding the answers by approach,
and (3) analysis of the results.
To develop the code dictionary two coders independently re-
viewed the answers of the open-ended questions and proposed
a list of categories. The list was discussed by the two coders
and agreed upon. The final dictionary contained the following
five codes: (1) copy-paste issues, (2) check-code issues, (3)
missing feedback issues, (4) comprehension-related issues and
(5) QR-code issues. The code copy-paste issues is specific to
the manual approach. The code QR-code issues is specific to
the mobile approach. The code check-code issues is specific to
the manual approach and automatic approach. All other co-
des apply to all approaches. Two of the paper’s authors coded
all answers independently (grouped by the three investigated
approaches). The level of agreement was 76.5%. The findings
were discussed and final allocations agreed upon. We report
the results by approach.
Manual Approach
Based on the answers given by the participants, we identified
four distinct issues: (1) copy-paste issues, (2) check-code issu-
es, (3) missing feedback issues, and (4) comprehension-related
issues.
(1) Copy-Paste Issues
The participants reported difficulties understanding what they
had to copy and paste and what the displayed verification data
is. They either misunderstood the instruction and thought that
they had to copy and paste the check-code, or they did not
understand what to copy and paste at all. Sample comments
given by the participants are5:
• “I thought that I had to copy and paste the check-code [...]”
• “I did not immediately know what to copy to where.”
5The comments are translated from the original German.
(2) Check-Code Issues
The participants’ answers revealed usability problems related
to the check-code. It has 43 characters comprising both num-
bers and letters. This sequence is admittedly long and caused
confusion. Hence, mistakes in writing it down and comparing
it in the last verification step are understandable. These mista-
kes can lead to a failure to notice a mismatch i.e. failing to
detect a vote manipulation. Alternatively, if voters mistaken-
ly write down the wrong check-code, and therefore notice a
mismatch during comparison, it could lead them to conclude
that a manipulation had occurred, thus undermining their trust
in the system. Note that this issue has also been reported in
other usability studies of the Benaloh Challenge [31, 32, 49].
Sample comments given by the participants are:
• “The verification with the code is annoying. It is too long. ”
• “I think it is easily possible to misread or mistype the check-
code, because of its length [...]”
(3) Missing Feedback Issues
The participants reported that they were unsure about the cur-
rent state of verification: the interface did not report the sta-
tus of verification clearly. Furthermore, the lack of format
checking during copy-pasting was problematic. A sample com-
ment is:
• “At first I pasted [the choice] SPD, which did not work. Then
I entered my check-code, also didn’t work. In all cases I
did not receive a notification whether or not the verification
was successful.”
(4) Comprehension-Related Issues
Some participants expressed dissatisfaction with the interface
instructions. They considered some instructions to be difficult
to understand. Sample comments are:
• “The wording of some instructions was not understanda-
ble/inconclusive.”
• “I had to read it [the instructions] several times.”
Automatic Approach
All the answers related to usability problems in the automatic
approach group were related to check-code issues. The check-
code issues reported by the participants are analogous to those
reported in the manual approach group. Sample comments are:
• “Copying and comparing the code is cumbersome. Mistakes
regarding long character sequences are human, thus likely
to occur [...]”
• “I found that the code was too long and the repeating letters
are confusing.”
Mobile Approach
The usability problems of the mobile approach were related
to the use of QR-codes. In particular, the participants repor-
ted problems regarding scanning duration. A voter willing
to perform verification might be discouraged by a too-long
scan duration and abort the verification. While the majority of
scans were very fast, the scanning duration was characterized
by large variations from 2 up to 150 seconds per QR-code.
Sample comments given by the participants are:
• “It takes relatively long until the check-code is scanned and
not every Smartphone has such a good camera to recognize
the info on the screen.”
• “I aborted verification because scanning the code took ex-
tremely long.”
Further Findings
The open-ended questions offer two prominent further fin-
dings: (1) some participants mistakenly thought that they had
completed verification, and (2) some were confused by the
fact that verified votes could not subsequently be cast.
(1) Participants mistakenly thought that they had verified
According to the screen-recordings, 18.75% of participants
in the manual approach and 38.7% in the automatic and mo-
bile approaches were unable to complete verification. The
open-coding analysis provides insights into the problems the
participants experienced, but does not uncover whether the
participants mistakenly thought that they had verified. Hence,
we compared the results from the screen-recordings with the
answers from the open-ended questions to find out about this
misperception. In the manual approach 25.8% (N = 8) of
participants stated in the questionnaire, that they have veri-
fied successfully although the screen-recordings clearly show
they have failed. In fact, they have started, but aborted the
verification process. We also observed this misperception in
the automatic approach (12.5%, N = 4) and mobile approach
(9.4%, N = 3). This is evidence of understandability issues or
due to insufficient feedback being provided by the interface.
(2) Confusion that a verified vote cannot subsequently be cast
Many participants expressed confusion about the nature of the
Benaloh Challenge in the open-ended questions. This was not
covered by the open-coding analysis, since it not a usability-
related problem. In particular, participants were surprised that
it was not possible to cast their verified vote. They considered
this counter intuitive, because the vote they actually cast is
submitted without verification. This shows that participants
either need more information about the Benaloh Challenge or
an approach in which the cast vote can be verified.
DISCUSSION & REFLECTION
In considering our results, we first identify and discuss several
important areas where the verification was shown to be particu-
larly challenging to the voters and where improvements might
be particularly useful. We furthermore make recommendations
related to effectiveness improvements that apply to all approa-
ches. We conclude with a number of final recommendations
on which approaches to use in elections.
Evaluation Results
All three approaches received very similar SUS scores. A
possible explanation for this might be that we have captured
the SUS score of the overall voting system (i.e. verifying and
vote casting). Hence, as vote casting is performed in the same
way within all three systems, the SUS scores converge. A
study from related work [1], that measured the SUS score of
Benaloh Challenge specifically, shows that Benaloh Challenge
using the manual approach has very poor satisfaction (SUS
score of 20), while having a similar overall SUS score to
the one we measured. Considering that, the satisfaction from
the verification specifically could significantly differ from the
satisfaction related to the overall voting system.
Verification using the automatic and mobile approaches is si-
gnificantly faster than verification using the manual approach.
This makes both approaches more efficient than the manu-
al approach. This is important because verification can, and
ought, to be repeated several times and this makes efficiency
important.
Our qualitative results reveal a number of problems partici-
pants experienced during the evaluation. Participants in the
manual approach experienced copy-paste, missing feedback
and comprehension-related issues. Of these, missing feedback
and comprehension-related issues can be mitigated by impro-
ved implementation and a better user interface (i.e. a more
prominent indicator of the verification status) or more detailed
explanations of the procedure in voting materials. The copy-
paste issues, however, are inherent in the manual approach.
While the usability of the copy-paste step can be improved
with additional instructions, the participants can still be over-
whelmed by the displayed cryptographic verification data they
have to interact with. This was, among others, one of the fin-
dings of the study performed by Weber and Hengartner [49].
Hence, as the verification data would always be displayed if
the manual approach is used, the copy-paste issues cannot be
fully mitigated.
Participants in the manual and automatic approaches experi-
enced problems with the check-code, in particular, in writing
it down and comparing it with a displayed value. These tasks
cannot be omitted in either of these approaches, since they
are crucial for the verification to take place. Hence, for the
sake of improving the usability of the manual and automatic
approaches, an easier way to enable comparison of check-code
should be provided to the voters. As visual comparisons of
complex strings is known to be problematic in a range of disci-
plines [17, 36, 47], improvements of the manual and automatic
approaches would present a particularly difficult challenge.
The mobile approach automates recording and comparison
of check-codes, which removes this burden from the voter.
Still, in preparing the prototype and conducting our user study
with the mobile approach we uncovered issues related to the
use of QR-codes which were not investigated by Neumann et
al. [38] when they proposed the mobile approach. We describe
the QR-codes-related issues and possible solutions to them in
more details below.
One issue with the usage of QR-codes is that the durations
of QR-code scans are unreliable and exhibit an undesirable
variation. Scanning a QR-code is dependent on the display, the
ambient light and the quality of the Smartphone camera. Voters
might abstain from verification if the scan takes too long. In
real-life, a fall-back method for transferring the data from the
voting to the verification device will have to be provided to
engender resilience. The QR-code size on the computer screen
could be adjusted to maximize the chance of a successful scan.
The QR-code issue in the mobile approach might be mitigated
by an improved implementation.
Another QR-code related issue, which we uncovered while
preparing the prototype for the user study, is the amount of
data being coded. The verification data in the current Helios
implementation comprises a number of cryptographic com-
ponents which results in 75,309 characters6 to be transferred
for verification in the scenario from the user study (i.e. an
election with one question and 21 voting options). A QR-code,
however, has an upper bound of only 7,089 characters for
numeric content and an upper bound of 4,296 characters in
case of alpha-numeric content [40]. Since the prototype in our
study is only a click dummy, we simplified the data, to be able
to use only one QR-code. In a realistic scenario the QR-code
would be composed of alpha-numeric characters, because the
data needs to be labeled to distinguish between the check-code,
the option and the individual random value. Hence the current
data format would not fit into one QR-code. To reduce the data
in the QR-code it could contain only a link referring to the
verification data, as applied in the Estonian system [44].
Effectiveness Improvements
Since a successful verification contributes to the integrity of
the election result, voters who are willing to perform verifica-
tion should be able to do so. Although we could not determine
significant effectiveness differences between the three approa-
ches, not all participants could successfully verify their votes.
Even though between 61.3 and 81.25% were indeed able to
verify successfully, the fact that the remaining 18.75 to 38.7%
were unable to do so suggests that there is potential for further
improvement. It is particularly alarming that in all investigated
approaches participants thought they had verified although
they have failed. They thought that verification had already
occurred: a clear usability failure. It is necessary to convey,
more clearly, the status of verification to the voter, ensuring
that the need for extra steps is clear in all three approaches.
This communication could be achieved by providing a status
or progress bar. The current instantiation contains a button
labelled “back to voting”. If voters click on this button they
should be informed that this, in effect, aborts the verification.
Final Recommendations
Based on our usability evaluation, we recommend the mobile
approach for deployment during elections. Many of the pro-
blems that participants reported in the questionnaire could be
mitigated by improved implementations. However, the mobile
approach’s use is limited to supplementary device owners (e.g.
a Smartphone), of which there were only 78% in Germany,
according to the latest survey [46]. Therefore, for greater in-
clusivity we recommend offering the automatic approach as a
fall-back. The automatic approach can serve as an alternative
for those who do not own Smartphones.
It has to be acknowledged, however, that the verification data
is no longer displayed to the voter in the automatic and mobile
approaches. As already proposed by Karayumak et al. [32], the
verification data should still be available in an auxiliary expert
mode. Expert voters can then conduct manual verification,
perhaps by using their own programmed verifier.
6Number obtained from the Helios Online Demo https://
heliosvoting.org/, accessed 08-25-17
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The user study was restricted to first-time voters (age 17-22
years) of the German Federal Parliament. This affects genera-
lizability to all eligible German voters. Further studies should
therefore include different age groups and bigger samples.
In order to better study the effects of different verification
approaches on the satisfaction of the voters, it would be be-
neficial to capture the SUS score of the verification task only.
Since the user study presented in [1] shows significant diffe-
rences between the overall voting system and the verification
task, it should be investigated in future research for the three
approaches that we investigated in this paper.
With respect to efficiency, the automatic and the mobile approa-
ches demonstrate a significant improvement over the manual
approach. However, to perform verification using the mobile
approach, the voter has to search, download and install the
verification application. The time taken for these tasks is not
included in our timings. Furthermore, for better assurance a
voter might be willing to use more than one verification app-
lication from different institutions. Thus, even if the mobile
approach was, on average, 70.2 seconds faster than the manual
approach, it is likely that voters would require additional time
to search, download and install the verification application.
Because of that, we can only conclude that the actual verifi-
cation, using the mobile approach, is more efficient than the
manual approach.
The focus of this study was solely on usability. As such, the
participants were not incentivized to verify and did not receive
any instructive or informative material apart from the infor-
mation provided by the voting website. Results from the addi-
tional questions underline the importance of voter motivation
and the understandability of the voting system. Participants
who thought that verification was complex or time-consuming
did not want to verify. Furthermore, participants stated that
they do not wish to verify, because they did not understand
the purpose of it. Especially, the fact that the verified vote
could not be cast was confusing for voters. 22.1% of overall
participants mentioned this in the questionnaire. It is unlikely
that voters would perform verification in a real election if these
perceptions persist. Therefore, investigating understandability,
and its impact on verification, should be the focus of future
research.
While mental models of verifiability in electronic voting have
already been explored e.g. by [2, 39], research in this direc-
tion should be extended further in order to investigate the
understandability of verification approaches and its effects on
the voters’ willingness to verify. Finally, alternatives to the
Benaloh Challenge that provide cast-as-intended verifiability,
such as return code approaches [42], should be considered in
future investigations. Previous research has already started to
investigate the usability of this approach [33], and as such, a
comparison of its usability with the usability of the Benaloh
Challenge should be performed.
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